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Abstract
A number of authors have proposed theories of eciency wages to explain
the behaviour of aggregate labor markets. According to these theories, rms do
not adjust wages downwards despite available unemployed job seekers, because
lower wages would induce hired workers to shirk more often, which in turn
would be counterproductive for the rm. Eciency wage theories thus aid in
explaining, why \involuntary" unemployment can persist. According to one
popular version by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), it is precisely the threat of
unemployment which induces workers to provide eort.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the cyclical consequences of an ef-
ciency wage theory, when eort is an adjustable variable. To that end, we ex-
amine such a theory in the context of a dynamic real business cycle framework.
The paper shows, that increasing the variability of eort due to eciency wage
consideration helps in explaining the rather large cyclical employment move-
ments as well as the rather low cyclical movements in real wages, supporting the
point made by Solow (1979), but require unplausibly large movements in the
technology parameter. Because of the latter aspect, we argue that adjustable
eort due to eciency wage considerations is unlikely to play an important role
for understanding business cycles.
We are grateful to Willem Buiter, Michael Burda, Gerard Pfann, John Shea, Martin Lettau, Ed
Prescott and V.V. Chari as well as seminar participants at several seminars for useful comments.
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Postbus 90153; 5000 LE Tilburg; HOLLAND; e-mail: uhlig@kub.nl and; Yexiao Xu; Princeton
University; Department of Economics; Princeton, NJ 08544; U.S.A.
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1 Introduction
One of the success stories of macroeconomic research over the last decade has been
the development of real business cycle models. These models analyze business cycle
movements as the systematic reactions of an economy to stochastic shocks, inuenc-
ing, in particular, production (see Kydland and Prescott (1982) for the origin and
Cooley (1995) and the volume in which it is published, for the latest summary of
this line of research). Crucial in all of these models is the description of the labor
market: since cyclical movements in output are foremost movements in aggregate
labor, any model that proposes to explain business cycles must explain the rather
large cyclical movements in employment. In the benchmark real business cycle model
of Hansen (1985), these movements are explained as the result of indivisibilities in
the labor market: agents are either employed or unemployed. They participate in
a lottery for jobs: the \unlucky" agents are told to work, whereas the \lucky" ones
are unemployed and can thus enjoy their additional leisure time. The device of the
lottery ensures the desired high intertemporal substitutability of leisure in the social
planners problem. Exogeneous, stochastic uctuations in the aggregate productivity
(the Solow residual) are then enough to drive the cycle and to explain the procyclical-
ity of the average productivity of labor. Using standard Solow residual accounting,
the size of these exogeneous shocks can be calibrated to actual data. The model then
implies cyclical properties for all variables in the model, which compare favourably
to their observed properties.
For a variety of reasons, however, some researchers do not nd this line of rea-
soning convincing. It has been argued that unemployment is \involuntary", i.e. that
unemployed workers would prefer to accept work at current wages rather than re-
maining unemployed. Ecient risk sharing as assumed in the real business cycle does
not preclude involuntary unemployment, see Rogerson and Wright (1988). But there
are other approaches: in particular, theories of eciency wages have been suggested
to understand involuntary unemployment and to explain why wages would thus not
adjust downwards to clear the labor market. One popular version due to Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) views unemployment as a device which threatens hired workers
into providing the eort their employer seeks. For the threat to be eective, it must
be more attractive to be a worker rather than to be unemployed. Firms will not
lower their wages because reducing the wedge to being unemployed reduces its threat
and may provide the workers to shirk more. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) examined
a model, where workers only face a binary choice between providing eort or not
doing so, but it seems natural to examine extensions, in which workers can choose
the degree of eort provided.
The goal of this paper is to analyze how much eciency wage considerations with
variations in eort can contribute in understanding business cycle uctuations. We
develop a new real business cycle style model with eciency wage features, in which
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this question can be analyzed. Depending on the choice of a particular parameter,
the model allows for a continuum of possibilities between constant eort and large
eort uctuations. The paper develops the key insight, that the eciency wage story
above implies a countercyclical movements in eort: if unemployment acts as a threat,
that threat should be more pronounced if unemployment is high. As a result, eort
movements due to eciency wage eects will partially oset movements in the tech-
nology parameter, requiring larger movements in that parameter in order to explain
observed Solow residual uctuations. This argument is, at the same time the rationale
for performing these calculations in a real business cycle framework: since the model
is driven by technology shocks, it has at least in principle the chance of explaining the
observed procyclicality of productivity. Compared to other explanations of business
cycle uctuations, the model is therefore in principle favorably disposed to allow-
ing for additional, countercyclical eort movements due to eciency wages: the nal
judgement then becomes a matter of quantities. The paper shows, that increasing the
variability of eort due to eciency wage consideration helps in explaining the rather
large cyclical employment movements as well as the rather low cyclical movements in
real wages, supporting the argument of Solow (1979), but requires unplausibly large
movements in the technology parameter.
Real business cycle models with eciency wages have been studied before, notably
by Danthine and Donaldson (1990, 1995), who have demonstrated that eciency wage
consideration can improve our understanding of business cycles. While we follow their
modelling choices in several respect, we cannot do so completely as eort turns out
to be constant in the equilibria of their models. Since eort movements are at the
heart of the problem studied here, a new model needed to be developed, which we do.
One way of thinking about the paper at hand is that there are indeed good reasons
why Danthine and Donaldson (1990, 1995) did not consider model versions, in which
eort varies systematically over the cycle. On the more technical side and compared
to Danthine and Donaldson (1990, 1995), this paper presents the innovation to turn
workers born in period t eventually into innitely lived capital owners (\ rentiers"),
i.e. we use a Blanchard-Weil-type model structure, see Weil (1987). This has the
advantage to tie in the labor supply and eort supply choices with the intertemporal
savings problem and it makes it easier to explain the cyclical variability of investment
at its data-given steady state share of output.
Section 2 develops the heuristics of the arguments above a bit further. Section 3
describes the model, while section 4 presents the results. Section 5 investigates the
theoretical possibility of procyclical eort movements due to eciency wages. Section
6 concludes.
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2 A heuristic comparison
Before diving into the construction of the fully specied model, it is a good idea to





where Yt is (detrended) output, K is the capital stock, held constant for the sake
of this argument, f is a constant scale factor, At is the (detrended) technological
productivity parameter, Nt is total labor, Qt is eort (or \quality") or work
2, and 
is the labor share. We suppose that changes inAt are stochastically driving the model,
i.e. At uctuates stochastically around some long-run mean and all other variables
are functions of At. This point of view allows one to easily explain the procyclicality
of the productivity of labor. In particular, high values of At signify \good times",
resulting in high employment Nt.
We now compare three views with respect to eort movements Qt. In the rst
benchmark view, Qt is xed for anybody who works. This point of view is taken in
most of the real business cycle literature as e.g in Hansen (1985), but also in a sizeable
part of the eciency wage literature, where eort is (eventually) either provided or
not provided, but not adjusted on a continuous scale, see e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) or Danthine and Donaldson (1990, 1995). The second view, which is the point
of view examined in this paper, sees eort movements due to the cyclically varying
threat of unemployment. According to that point of view, eort should be the higher
in recessions, because the threat of unemployment is larger then. According to the
third view, rm-worker relationships are characterized by labor hoarding. With labor
hoarding, rms hesitate to re workers even during recessions e.g. because it is costly
to nd new workers in the next upswing, see e.g. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(1993). To sum up, while Qt is simply constant in the benchmark real business cycle
model or in constant-eort eciency wage models, it is an increasing function of At
in the labor hoarding model, but a decreasing function in a variable-eort eciency
wage model. To remember this graphically, we have sketched the relationship in gure
1a.
Applying standard Solow residual accounting to equation (1) leads to
st =  (at + qt)(2)
where st denotes the Solow parameter, at the log-deviation of At, and qt the log-
deviation of Qt,
at = log(At)  E[log(At)]
qt = log(Qt)  E[log(Qt)]
2Using the symbol \Et" instead to denote eort would be confusing.
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(where E[] denotes unconditional expectations). While movements in st are syn-
onymous with movements in the exogeneous technology parameter at, the measured
Solow parameter movements overstate these exogeneous technological changes in the
labor hoarding view, but understate them in the eciency wage view. Thus, to
explain the same measured uctuations in the Solow residual, the labor hoarding
model should be expected to need smaller and the eciency wage model to need
larger uctuations in the exogeneous technological change than the benchmark real
business cycle model, see gure 1b. This should be a warning sign for the eciency
wage model: uncomfortably large uctuations in the exogeneous shocks are needed
to explain business cycle dynamics. The diculty which the eciency wage model
with exible eort runs into is the well-documented and often discussed phenomenon
of procyclical labor productivity or short-run increasing returns to labor (SRIRL),
see e.g. Fay and Medo (1985) or Bernanke and Parkinson (1991). Explaining this
phenomenon has always been tricky: using countercyclical eort movements certainly
doesn't help.
On the other hand, the eciency wage model should easily be able to explain the
rather large cyclical movements in employment. In a recession, i.e. for a low value
of At, rms will cut back on their employment Nt. This increase in unemployment
threatens workers with jobs into working harder, making them more ecient. As
a result, rms need even fewer workers to produce some desired amount, resulting
in even greater unemployment. The reaction of eort amplies the unemployment
dynamics. This together with the low cyclical variability of wages is the key point in
Solow (1979). Eciency wage models, in which eort can vary, can thus help in ex-
plaining the often documented observation by Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939), that
real wages move fairly little over the cycle and are fairly acyclical, see the discussion
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), while employment moves quite a bit.
The opposite is true for the labor hoarding model. At the very heart of that model,
rms aim at keeping workers on the payroll during recessions rather than ring them.
As a result, the model must end up predicting low cyclical variation in unemployment
These low cyclical variations are at odds with the observed facts. Figure 1c shows
this dilemma graphically.
Thus, while the eciency wage model is likely to resort to unreasonably large
stochastic uctuations in the exogeneous shocks driving the model, the labor hoarding
model is likely to underpredict the rather large cyclical variations in unemployment,
which is after all one of the key facts of business cycles. For these reasons, eort
seems best to be ignored for understanding business cycle movements as is done in
the benchmark Hansen (1985) model or in extensions such as Danthine and Donaldson
(1990, 1995).
Such a heuristic argument can be only partially convincing, of course. Important
general equilibrium eects can be easily overlooked in intuitive arguments such as
these, and can be uncovered by fully specifying a complete model and solving for its
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implications. To do this for the variable-eort eciency wage model is the purpose
of the rest of this paper. The model can also lead one to investigate other possibly
plausible aspects, see section 5.
3 The Model
Briey, time is discrete, t = 0; 1; : : :. There is a good each period which can be used
for consumption or investment into capital. Furthermore, there is labor. There are
capital owners, workers, competitive rms and a government. Each period, a new
equally-sized generation of workers is born, seeking a job on the labor market in their
rst period of life. They work for a wage, if employed, but receive unemployment
compensation, if unemployed. After their rst period, they turn into capital owners
(\rentiers") living forever after. The details are described now. We start with the
problem of the capital owners, since it will be used later to derive the behaviour of
workers on the labor market.
3.1 The rentiers problem
Each period t, a new generation of rentiers is added to the pool of existing capital






























where Rt is the return in period t per unit of capital K
(s)
t ; t > s held by rentiers born
at date s, where C
(s)
t is his consumption, and where  is the discount factor.
It is not hard to show that C
(s)
t = (1   )RtKt and C
(s)
s = (1   )Is for the
generation born at date s and that







These results will be useful below.
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3.2 Production













where  is the labor share, At is the (detrended) technological productivity parameter,
evolving according to




and Qt is eort (or \quality") or work, which evolves according to an incentive com-
patibility constraint, which we will state below, see equation (5).







and investment, so that
Ct +Kt+1 = Yt + (1  )Kt
where  is the depreciation rate of capital.
3.3 Markets
Capital and labor are rented by rms on capital and labor markets for one period for
a dividend Dt and wages Wt according to their marginal product,







Since capital depreciates at the rate  > 0, the return on holding capital is given by
Rt = Dt + 1   
Eort Qt = Q(Wt; Ut;Zt) is a function of wages Wt, the unemployment rate












where  is a constant and the increasing function G(Q) is the disutility for providing
eort Q. In section 3.4 we will provide a detailed justication for (5), but for now
it may suce for now to accept (5) simply as an assumption about the behaviour of
workers. Intuitively, the worker compares the disutility of providing eort G(Qt) with
the indirect utility log (Wt=Zt) of receiving a higher compensation (Wt rather than
Zt) if employed rather than unemployed. That utility is weighted with the factor
Ut
1 Ut
: with a larger unemployment rate, the replacement ratio wedge Wt=Zt becomes
more important, because unemployment becomes more threatening.
Equation (5) allows us to investigate some comparative statics. Since the disutility
for providing eort is increasing, eort Qt = Q(Wt; Ut;Zt) itself will be increasing
in the unemployment rate Ut and the replacement ratio Wt=Zt. For the numerical




0 if Q = 0
(1    + Q) if Q > 0
(6)
The parameter  can be chosen freely in the model and allows to vary the eort
response between very small (at  close to zero) and very large (at  = 1). A graph
of the disutility function for several parameters is given in gure 2: in that graph, we
have arbitrarily set  = 1, but imposed a the relationship log W=Z = 1, which can
be shown to hold in the steady state of this model. Also note that we normalize the
steady state eort to be equal to Q = 1.
Firms take the dependence of eort on wages into account, when hiring workers.
Thus, there will be the usual Solow condition, stating that the elasticity of eort with







As Solow (1979) pointed out, this condition enables one derive the prediction, that
wages adjust less than in models without eort movements.
We will justify this condition in section 3.4 below and demonstrate, that one can







with some constant  > 0 for the numerical calculations. More importantly, this
equation shows the relationship between eort and unemployment claimed in the
heuristic section of this paper quite clearly: when unemployment goes up, eort must
go up as well to keep this equation satised.
The unemployment compensation Zt is assumed to be paid by the government,
which in turn nances it via a proportional tax t on wage payments as well as un-
employment compensation payments. The government is assumed to run a balanced
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budget each period. Thus, the budget constraint of the government is
ZtUt = t (ZtUt +WtNt)
We will concentrate on situations, in which the before-tax unemployment compensa-
tion is held constant, Zt  Z.
Workers born in period t become rentiers after one period of working, using their
wage income It = (1  t)Wt or their unemployment compensation It = (1  t)Zt to
\get started". Thus, their expected utility will be
Ut = Nt (Vt ((1  t)Wt) G(Qt)) + UtVt ((1   t)Zt) ;
where we have used Nt and Ut as probabilities for being employed resp. unemployed.
This expected utility can be used to evaluate welfare consequences of, say, tax policies.
With these elements, it is now possible to solve for the model. We loglinearized all
equations around the steady state, see e.g. Uhlig, 1995. Because the consumption-
savings-problem can be solved in closed form, calculating the solution to the loglin-
earized set of equations is straightforward. Details are available from the authors.
3.4 A detailed view of the labor market
Above, we have assumed, that (5) describes the attitude of workers towards providing
eort without providing more than a bit of heuristic support. The purpose of this
section is to give a detailed justication by providing a detailed view of the labor
market. To provide this description, we shall drop the time subscript for this sub-
section only. There is some large number of workers and an even larger number of
rms. The labor market unfolds according to the following mechanism, described by
a sequence of steps:
1. Shirking choice: Each worker i commits to a positive eort-for-wage func-
tion Qi(W ), which, wherever Qi(W ) > 0, is twice dierentiable with Q
00
i (W ) <
0. That choice is not observable to others. The worker announces an eort-for-
wage function Q
(a)
i (W ), which may dier from Qi(W ): below we will envoke
the revelation principle to make sure that it does not. The announcement is
publicly observable to everybody.
2. First round of entry:
(a) Each rm decides whether to enter or not.
(b) Upon entering, each rm chooses one worker. If several rms choose the
same worker, a lottery is held to determine the \lucky" rms, whereas the
other rms choose a new worker etc. until either all workers are matched
with some rm or all entering rms are matched with one worker so that
no rm and no worker is a member of two matches.
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(c) Monitoring: With some exogenously given probability pm, the rm gets
to observe the eort-for-wage functionQi(W ) actually chosen by the matched
worker i.
(d) Firms having entered can choose to exit again, i.e. to re the worker.
3. Second round of entry:
(a) Each unmatched rm, i.e. each rm not having entered in the rst round
or having chosen to exit again, decides whether to enter or not.
(b) Upon entering, each rm chooses one remaining worker, i.e. a worker who
was not chosen or was red in the rst round. It cannot be observed
whether the worker was previously red or not. A lottery similar to the
one described above is held to achieve unique matches.
4. The workday:
(a) For each nal rm-worker pair, the rm chooses a wage Wi and rents some
capital Ki at the market rate d. It pays the worker the wage and the
worker supplies eort according to Qi(Wi). The rm produces and sells
nal output Yi = f(Ki; Qi(Wi)). Workers keep (1    )Wi, where  is a
proportional labor income tax.
(b) Workers without a contract receive unemployment compensation Z and
keep (1    )Z
This structure seems complicated but it is not. The essence here is that eort Q is
unobservable and can equal zero, if the worker chooses to shirk. What prevents him
from shirking is the fear of loosing his job in the \rst round" and then having a hard
time getting rehired in the \second round". The larger the unemployment, the more
unlikely it is to be rehired, and thus the greater the incentive eect. Spelling out the
exact mechanism is necessary to allow for a precise contract-theoretic analysis.
Firms are assumed to maximize prots and workers are assumed to maximize
expected utility E [V (I) G(Q)], where V () is the indirect utility function for after-
tax income and where G(Q) is the disutility of providing eort Q, G(0) = 0. Invoking
the revelation principle, we can assume that Qai (W ) = Qi(W ) for all wages W ,
provided that the worker has no incentive not to tell the truth. The appropriate
incentive compatibility constraint has to hold, which we will develop below.
The production function was assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. Given Qi(W ), a rm






Thus, rms will seek workers who promise the highest eort at any given wage,
as long as the incentive compatibility constraint for truth telling is satised. This
\Betrand competition" feature between workers leads all workers to choose the same
Q(W ) which just satises the incentive compatibility constraint to be stated below.
All rms thus end up solving the same problem at the last stage of the mechanism.
Importantly, the wage paid by the rm or other features of the solution to the rms'
problem do not depend on whether the worker was hired in the rst or the second
round or whether he was monitored and found to tell the truth. I.e., while the worker
must commit to a particular eort-for-wage function by assumption, the rm cannot
commit to other payment patterns beforehand: the contract is renegotiation-proof
from the perspective of conceivable renegotiation possibilities for the rm. Should
the rm monitor the worker and nd him not to tell the truth and to actually provide
less eort than announced, the rm will re the worker since it will make a negative
prot otherwise.
Due to the zero prot condition, rms are indierent between entering and not
entering in any of the two rounds, and thus may enter only with some probability.
Let p1 be the chance for a worker to be matched to some rm in the rst round
and p2 the chance for a remaining worker to be matched to some rm in the second
round. One may alternatively think of every worker being matched to some rm in
the rst round, but 1  p1 rms closing again due to turnover: the mathematics does
not depend on that interpretation. The chance for a nonshirking worker to have a
job at the end of the second round is therefore p1 + (1   p1)p2, whereas he will be
unemployed with probability pns = (1   p1)(1   p2). The expected (indirect) utility
for a nonshirker is therefore
Vns = (1  pns) (V ((1   )W ) G(Q)) + pnsV ((1    )Z)
If the worker chooses not to tell the truth, he fares best by providing zero eort
throughout, risking ring when monitored. Such a shirkerr thus risks being red,
when monitored. His probability of being unemployed is thus the probability of
being unemployed just as a nonshirker, plus the probability of having received a job
in the rst round, but being red due to monitoring and not being rehired in the
second round. Formally,









The expected (indirect) utility for a shirker is thus
Vs = (1   ps)V ((1    )W ) + psV ((1   )Z)
To make truth-telling incentive compatible, it needs to be the case that
Vs  Vns
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By assumption about all the bargaining power resting with the rms, this equation
will be satised with equality. Substituting in from above, one obtains

















and where the unemployment rate equals the probability of a nonshirker to be un-
employed, U = pns , since everybody will tell the truth in equilibrium. Note that 
does not depend on p2. Assuming only p2 to uctuate with total employment, i.e.
assuming  to be independent of time and exploiting the indirect utility function V ()
as given by equation (3), equation (10) turns into equation (5).
As for the rm, solving its problems leads to the following rst order conditions
from dierentiation with respect to Kt and Wt:







where Y = K1 i (AQi(W ))
. Due to the zero prot condition, we must have W =
Y  DK = Y with the rst rst order condition. Using this in the second rst order




as claimed in equation (7).
To analyze the properties of the model, it shall be pointed out, that it is useful
to dierentiate (9) with respect to W , noting that Q = Q(W ). For V () = log() and






p1 + (1   p1)p2









as claimed in equation (8). This equation can be used in place of (2), when numerically
analyzing the behaviour of this model by, say, loglinearizing the system.
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4 Results
To calibrate the model, a few additional parameters had to be chosen which do not
typically appear in real business cycle models. The calibration is done by xing the
steady state values of some endogenous variables and then backing out the parameters
implied this way. We normalized Q = 1 in all steady states. We have normalized the
steady state replacement ratio to equal W= Z = 2, which is a value found elsewhere
in the literature. The steady state unemployment rate was set at U = 0:05: one
should think of this rate as the \threatening" part of unemployment, i.e. of workers
trying hard to nd a job. The parameter  has been set to various values between 0
to 1 so as to vary the eort response to a technology shock between weak to strong.
The other calibrating values are fairly standard: R = 1:01,  = :64,  = :025 and
normalizing Y = exp(8:57). Backing out the fundamental parameters requires some
algebra: details can be obtained from the authors.
US Hansens With eciency wages
Data benchmark
 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.95 1.0
y 1.72 1.62 1.25 1.30 1.63 1.92 3.26
c 0.86 0.86 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.98
x 5.34 4.29 4.48 4.66 5.86 6.90 11.75
h 1.69 1.30 0.08 0.16 0.68 1.13 3.26
w 0.76 1.23 1.16 1.14 0.95 0.79 0.01
q 0.00 1.13 8.53 14.92 44.24
SR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
 1.4 1.4 2.3 8.0 12.9 36.1
Table 1: This table compares the results of the model considered here with US data as
well as Hansen benchmark RBC model. The standard deviation  of the innovation
to the technology paramater has been chosen so as to keep SR constant at the US
level for the calculations for the model considered in this paper.
The results can best be seen from the table 1, comparing the behaviour of the
model to some key characteristics of business cycle features in the US as well as to
Hansens (1985) benchmark model. The numbers about the US Data are taken from
Cooley and Prescott (1995). All data is Hodrick-Prescott-ltered. The cyclical aver-
age deviation from trend in percent is given by y for output, by c for consumption,
by x for investment, by h for hours worked, by w for (real) wages, while  is the
standard deviation of the technology innovation. A period denotes quarters of a year.
As is standard practice in this literature, the standard deviation of the shock t to the
log-technology process log(At) has always been chosen so as to deliver the observed
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Solow residual uctuations. A plot of the impulse response functions is given in gure
3.
As one can see, the eciency wage features help in explaining the rather large
cyclical variation in employment (h) as well as the puzzlingly low cyclical variation
in wages (w), if one uses   :95, say. However, this comes at a price: the standard
deviation of the technology innovation required to explain the observed output uc-
tations is easily seven times as large as the value used by Hansen (1985), and thus
unreasonably large. The explanation is simple: in this model, eort movements are
countercyclical. Large eort reactions therefore largely oset the technology inno-
vation, so that the movement in the observed procyclical Solow parameter is just a
fraction of the underlying technology parameter. If one was willing to accept such
large technology shocks, the parameterization with  = 0:95, in which the observed
Solow residual uctuations are matched, actually come remarkably close to observed
numbers. However, most researchers will probably have diculties accepting tech-
noloogy uctuations amounting to more than 12 percent per quarter: this just does
not seem like a fruitful explanation.
5 Procyclical Eort?
In our heuristic arguments, we have stressed that the eort movements predicted by
eciency wage theories are countercyclical: in fact, most of the argument above rests
on this claim. We have backed up this theoretical insight with equation (8), which
shows that eort needs to go up when unemployment does. However, the theory does
not preclude other cases, and it is interesting to examine them. To that we need to
recall how equation (8) was actually derived from equation (11). In that equation,
p1 was the chance of keeping a job on a primary labor market pm was the chance
of being monitored and possibly red, when found to be shirking, and p2 was the
chance of receiving a job on the secondary labor market, given not having a job from
the rst labor market. What we have assumed to arrive at equation (8) was, that
only the probability of nding a job p2 on some secondary labor market uctuates
with total employment. In economic terms, a red worker will have a lesser chance
of nding another job, when unemployment is high: this is precisely what makes
unemployment so threatening. Times of high unemployment are thus characterized
by lower job turnover: it simply means less rehiring.
However, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) have recently documented, that the oppo-
site appears to be true: times of high unemployment seem to be times of high job
turnover as well. This can be captured here as well: rather than having p2 respond
to employment uctuations, one might assume that p1 uctuates with employment
instead, while p2 and pm remain constant. Higher unemployment means a lower value
for p1, which also means that, in absolute terms, more people will be hired on the
14









Now, eort responds negatively to higher unemployment! The intuition is simple.
According to our \microfoundation" of the labor market, workers only fear to be
monitored on the primary labor market. If the chance of keeping a job there is
decreased as in times of high unemployment, less importance needs to be attached
to that fear. In essence, the workers cannot induced to provide a lot of eort by
threatening them to monitor and possibly re them, if they face the prospect of
loosing their job anyhow.
US Hansens With eciency wages
Data benchmark
 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.95 1.0
y 1.72 1.62 1.13 1.06 0.33 1.62 3.28
c 0.86 0.86 0.35 0.32 0.10 0.48 0.97
x 5.34 4.29 4.06 3.82 1.19 5.86 11.80
h 1.69 1.30 0.10 0.20 1.34 4.33 3.28
w 0.76 1.23 1.22 1.27 1.67 2.70 0.00
q 0.00 1.27 15.00 51.31 40.97
SR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
 1.4 1.4 2.4 12.9 40.9 30.2
Table 2: Procyclical eort movements, p2 = 0:9. The standard deviation  of the
innovation to the technology paramater has been chosen so as to keep SR constant at
the US level for the calculations for the model considered in this paper.
The model allows us to examine the consequences of this choice too. We have
presented two fairly typical tables in 2 and 3, even though the choices for p2 may
have been a bit extreme. Impulse response functions to a technology shock for these
two parameters can be found in gure 4 and gure 5. One nds one of two situations:
p2 large , see table 2. Employment now reacts negatively to a productivity shock
and thus moves countercyclically. Essentially, times in which productivity is
high already from the underlying technology, eort gets stimulated even further
by decreasing employment. Certainly, countercyclical employment is highly
counterfactual.
p2 small , see table 3. Employment reacts positively to a productivity shock as it
should, but the dynamics becomes explosive: in table 3, we have also listed
the elasticity k of capital with respect to the existing capital stock and as one
15
can see, that elasticity is greater than 1. The intuition here is, that a posi-
tive reaction of employment to a productivity shock induces a positive upward
movement of eort, which in turn acts like an additional productivity shock,
leading to further expansion of employment etc.. Due to the unstable dynamics,
our numerical approach of loglinearizing around the steady state is no longer
valid: the numbers of table 3 should thus just be seen as indicative of what
can happen. In fact, this model may give rise to endogeneous cycles: a further
investigation may be merited.













We have just investigated the possibilities of keeping either p1 or p2 constant: a
rich set of intermediate cases is certainly conceivable, and investigating them would
require too much additional space. It does not seem that this \caveat" alters our
conclusions from the previous section much, however.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the cyclical consequences of an eciency
wage theory, when eort is an adjustable variable. To that end, we examined such a
theory in the context of a dynamic real business cycle framework. The paper shows,
that increasing the variability of eort due to eciency wage consideration helps
in explaining the rather large cyclical employment movements as well as the rather
low cyclical movements in real wages, but requires unplausibly large movements in
the technology parameter. Because of the latter aspect, we argued that adjustable
eort due to eciency wage considerations is unlikely to play an important role for
understanding business cycles.
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US Hansens With eciency wages
Data benchmark
 0.0 0.5 0.9 0.95 1.0
y 1.72 1.62 3.88 3.55 3.34 3.32 3.30
c 0.86 0.86 1.24 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.05
x 5.34 4.29 13.85 12.70 11.95 11.87 11.79
h 1.69 1.30 80.2 70.3 64.1 63.4 62.7
w 0.76 1.23 0.34 0.15 0.03 0.01 0.00
q 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.27
SR 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18
 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.24 1.23 1.22
k 1.017 1.016 1.016 1.015 1.015
Table 3: Procyclical eort movements, p2 = 0:1. The standard deviation  of the
innovation to the technology paramater has been chosen so as to keep SR constant at
the US level for the calculations for the model considered in this paper. The numbers
in this table should not be trusted, since the dynamics of this model is now inherently
unstable, see the root k. These numbers should thus simply be understood to be
indicative of the phenomena that will arise.
